Ransomware as a Service: How Anyone Can Buy a Cyberattack

You found the backup wrap up your go-to podcast for all things

backup recovery and cyber recovery.

In this episode, we talk about ransomware as a service.

My co-author, Dr. Mike Saylor, breaks down exactly how this criminal business

model works and I do mean business.

We're talking HR departments, project managers, affiliate programs, and yes.

Someone managing the payroll, we covered the franchise model.

How botnets get rented.

Who's buying these attack privileges and why?

The person who pays for the attack, it might just end up being the patsy.

This is a must listen.

By the way, if you don't know who I am, I'm w Curtis Preston, AKA, Mr.

Backup, and I've been passionate about backup and recovery for over 30 years.

Ever since I had to tell my boss there were no backups of the production

database that we had just lost.

I don't want that to happen to you, and that's why I do this.

On this podcast, we turn unappreciated admins into Cyber Recovery Heroes.

This is the backup wrap up.

Welcome to the backup wrap up.

I'm your host, w Curtis Preston, AKA, Mr. Backup, and I have with

me Prasanna Hard Stop Malaiyandi.

How's it going?

Prasanna got somewhere to be.

I think we should call you, uh, Curtis.

Likes to chat a lot, Preston.

I'll take it, I'll take it.

That's like, it's the whole reason why I got a podcast.

So I can, not only do I get to talk a lot, I get to listen to myself talk.

That's why I say the podcast is a perfect thing to do if

you like to hear yourself talk.

'cause you get to do it.

the exact opposite.

Yeah, exactly.

That's why you don't edit and you don't listen.

You don't listen to our podcast, right?

I do watch the shorts every once in a while, but yes, I do not listen to

Yeah,

episode.

I don't think I've listened to a single full episode.

yeah.

no, I take it back.

I did listen to two episodes, both of which did not include me.

It included when I was out.

It included Ben

Oh, the backup, the beer and backups.

Yeah.

s and backup.

where he got drunk while doing a podcast.

That was the best, best podcast ever.

All right, speaking of best podcast ever.

How's it going, Mike?

We got Dr. Mike Saylor on with us.

It's going well.

Hey guys.

So, you know what?

I've never, so we, we've never met in person, and so I, uh, I, I have no idea.

Like, uh, like how tall you are, how tall are you?

Six two.

Yeah, he's taller than me.

Prasanna, so now I'm gonna add him to my list.

how it feels normal.

So we had my 60th birthday party, uh, on Sunday, and Prasanna actually flew

down to, to go and, uh, he got to meet a number of my other local friends.

And let's just say, uh, he was not as tall as my other friends.

Yeah.

I had two friends that were six five.

Yeah.

And Carlos was probably what, over six foot?

And now?

And I'm six.

I'm, well, I used to be six foot, um, old age, but, um, yeah.

So anyway, well welcome to the podcast.

So we're, um, this week.

There, there was something that came up in a couple of episodes

ago, which I don't think we went in depth enough, and so I thought

we'd do an episode just about that.

So let me set the stage a little bit.

We talked in a previous episode about Crypto Locker and how that, that enabled

that technology and things like it, right?

So we started with Crypto Locker and then there's a number of other, uh,

bad guys that looked at that and went.

Went based on that model of asymmetric encryption and strong encryption.

Um, the problem really with that is that, you know, if you, if you're a

threat actor, this is complicated stuff.

Um, and so I, I think a lot of people.

They saw the money that people were starting to make with ransomware and they

wanted to get, they wanted to be a part of it, but they didn't know how to do that.

Does that seem like a good way to set the stage, Mike?

It is, and there's a risk component there too.

They didn't, they didn't want to take on all the risk.

Yeah.

Can you speak about that a little bit?

Sure.

And, and that's kind of when, when cyber crime became somewhat democratized.

You know, back in the day it was, you know, one person wrote the, wrote the

malware, uh, did the vulnerability assessments to find the way in, or

wrote the email or delivered the device, you know, whatever it is.

They were, they were involved from the development, the

delivery, and the execution.

And whether there that was, uh, you know, the execution of that was.

Contained to the, to the victim, you know, like a denial of

service or an outage or something.

Or it was more ransom or, or extortion related, where they're getting paid.

you, back in the day, that was all one person or a group

of people doing all of that.

and so through deregulation, I mean, uh, democratization of, of

cyber, uh, you, you now have these.

Threat actors that specialize.

So you've got the guys that, that just write the code.

You've got the people that just, you know, uh, uh, trade in, in access.

You've got the people that are really good at, um, ex exploiting

vulnerabilities and gaining access.

You have the people that broker in the data.

Uh, have the people that, uh, that.

Develop and manage the, the botnets that, that these bad guys use to, to,

uh, as the, the launchpad and the command and control for their, their attacks.

Uh, so yeah, all those are different businesses now.

Right.

And so getting into like, if, if you just woke up today and said, I'm gonna

start doing ransomware, then you've gotta become an expert in all that stuff,

Right.

Do they also have like HR and all the

Yeah.

Well, the bigger ones do.

Uh, so the more people you have, especially the, the different.

Uh, the different skill sets and now you've gotta have a project manager.

Uh, and then you've gotta have HR for dealing with, 'cause the project

manager is gonna be like that person.

I can't deal with that person.

I need someone that knows how to deal with people.

And so you've got hr, uh, you've got payroll, uh, you've got

someone to manage your finances and maybe even your investments.

You've got security, uh, bodyguards and physical security and even, even your

own cyber team to, to, to do the cyber for you, you know, for your organization.

'cause other bad guys are gonna attack you and.

enforcement's looking for you.

And so now you've got

mind

media people and, and PR campaigns and agents and it's, uh, it, it can be pro.

So now you need, you know, there's not a Yellow Pages for who, who can I call

to help me get into this business?

Um, so you've got a, you've gotta start networking and, and, you know, getting

your street cred, your legitimacy, and then you've gotta, you've gotta

identify ways to get your foot in the door or somebody that can help you.

Uh, develop that, that business that you're hoping to get into.

So then if we're talking, um.

So, all right, so first off, let's just talk about when, when we say ransomware as

a service, I think it's a little different when, when we talked about it a couple

episodes ago, it's a little different than I think I originally had envisioned it.

Um, do you want to describe what, what we mean when we say ransomware as a service?

There's different flavors of it.

There's, uh, it's, it's essentially a, you're, you're, you're buying

into a a point in time franchise.

You know, it's a campaign.

And so for, uh, a set amount, let's call it $30,000, you give

to a ransomware, uh, as a service organization, you give them $30,000.

Uh, or the equivalent in Bitcoin or some other crypto, you're

buying a package of service.

So that is, you know, a million email addresses that, that have been validated.

Uh, good, good ransomware that's been tested.

You know, it's gonna get past, you know, x percentage of anti-malware

antivirus software out there.

You set or they set the ransom.

So you know, if you wanna be really aggressive, it can be a higher ransom.

Or if you want to play the, the numbers, uh, you know,

statistically and get more, you know.

more success than maybe you, you go with a lower ransom, but they, they, you, you

negotiate all this, it's pre-configured.

Uh, and then they, they conduct the attack for you.

Uh, and either they can set up a bit, uh, a Bitcoin wallet or wallet or you

do, uh, and then that's, that's it.

You, you tell 'em, you pay them the money.

You tell 'em what you want and how you want it, and, and then you just sit back

and watch your wallet, collect money or not, depending on how successful it is.

That's it.

That's,

So,

as a service.

so.

That sounds pretty hands off, right?

For the, for the attacker.

I guess one question that I have is, so I'm the, I'm the threat actor that, that's

providing this Raz service and, and this person I'm gonna, I'm gonna attack this

like, new group of people on behalf of this person who's paid me $30,000 plus.

I'm assuming I'm getting a cut of the, of the ransom.

Okay.

Why if I, if I had the ability to attack this, this list of email addresses, why

wouldn't I just do that without this person and just take all, all the ransom?

Because you're getting paid upfront, so any, any

Okay.

campaign has an unknown success rate.

So I could send, I could send ransomware to a million emails and not get a thing,

Hmm.

but if you pay me $30,000.

I've already built, I've already pre-built this, right?

It's

Right,

you know, software, you build software and you sell it a million times.

Your ROI is huge.

right.

So these guys just have a cookie cutter approach to ransomware.

It's already, they've already put the time in to build it.

They just copy and paste, and

Do.

a minimum, they're making $30,000.

Do.

If I kind of think in my head, and maybe this isn't the right analogy,

but if I think about Amazon.

Amazon needed to figure out how to scale their infrastructure as a

business, and so they built out a bunch of infrastructure and managed it at

scale, and then they were like, Hey, other companies need this as well.

Let's spin.

Let's create AWS, and we can offer those same services to those customers

so they don't need to know all the intricacies and they can do the

exact same things that we Amazon as a bookstore, as a business do today.

that kind of the right way to think about this, Mike?

similar.

Yep.

Yep.

Yeah.

Interesting.

Yeah, I, I think, I think

and.

what really helps me is that, go ahead.

Except the bad guys don't maintain the infrastructure.

It goes away.

They, they create it on demand and it goes away when it's done.

So they're renting it from botnet

Oh, that's, yeah.

Interesting.

So they're, they're renting.

They, what they have is the software and, and the, the process, the framework.

Yeah.

And, and then they're renting the, the infrastructure from botnets, because

that was gonna be my next question is, well, where do they get the hardware on

which they're gonna run all this malware?

And the answer is a botnet.

You want to, again, we talked about it in the last episode.

Just give a quick de, uh, description of what a bot botnet is.

So botnet is compromised, uh, computers, endpoints and infrastructure.

Uh, that the end user's not aware of,

Mm-hmm.

um, you know, if you're, if if in the middle of the night your computer just

starts doing weird stuff, blinky lights and the fan comes on and your utilization

shoots up, then you've probably, you're probably part of a botnet, uh, unless

you're getting like a Windows update.

But, uh, you know, there are symptoms of.

Uh, but yeah, a botnet is, uh, unknowingly compromised infrastructure that is

managed by a, a botnet, uh, group.

That then rents that, rents, rents those resources out based on, on

your, your request for demand.

So, you know, there are, there are botnets out there of well over, you know, millions

of, of endpoints and infrastructure, uh, that you can, you can rent all of

it and do a, you know, a pointed denial of service attack on, on somebody.

And so now you've got a million computers, uh, attacking a, a

single target, you can just say.

Uh, I need, I need a sub.

I need a hundred computers with 20 core processors and this much memory and this

much, um, you know, maybe they're all Windows machines or whatever, uh, to do.

You don't even have to tell 'em what you're using it for.

You can just give 'em the specs and they'll carve off part of their botnet,

uh, and rent it to you by the hour, by the day, by the week, by the month.

So Mike, just say kind of one thing you had said previously is, okay,

the ransomware as a service people, right, they're able to be paid

upfront, right from their customers, and so they're guaranteed something

versus taking a chance with whether or not they would get a payout

from doing the attacks themselves.

If I go back to the Amazon analogy I brought up earlier,

one thing with that analogy is.

Amazon.

The business leverages AWS to build the infrastructure, to

build their capabilities, and so they're also a consumer of that

common infrastructure, right?

The same thing that customers use AWS for in the case of ransomware as a service.

Those actors, are they also launching attacks sometimes on their own?

addition to sell selling out their infrastructure, or is it just their

entire business is now focused on just finding other threat actors to sell to?

usually ransomware as as a service actors, that's, that's a side business.

So they're doing ransomware full-time as their their core business, and

then they've got this little side hustle to make some extra money.

Interesting.

By the way, to go back to the Amazon, um, analogy, I, I've never like verified

this, but what I was told was that.

Uh, AWS was born out of the fact that the demand for actual Amazon computers, for

amazon.com changes throughout the year.

Right?

Um, that, that basically during Christmas, they had, um, obviously a huge demand.

Spike.

and then after Christmas, that demand, uh.

Tanks.

Right.

And the idea, the original idea for AWS was to just sell the

unused hardware that they weren't using while they weren't using it.

And then all of a sudden they were like, Hey, I think we're onto something here.

So it sounds like it the same thing here, where basically they, they're

selling the, well in this case, again, Mike, I'm really glad that

you brought that up, that they're not providing the infrastructure per se.

They're providing the processes to software, uh, the lists, uh,

but they actually still rent the infrastructure, the physical

hardware from, from other people.

Yep.

Yeah.

And one, sorry not to keep poking on this, so for, so.

poke, poke.

So as, as far as you're aware though, like are there certain

things that the ransomware as a service people keep to themselves?

Like, Hey, this thing is very secret or special, and I'm not gonna sell it out to

other folks who are buying the ransomware as a service offering, and I'm just gonna

keep it because it's my secret sauce.

It's the thing that differentiates me as I'm doing my own attacks versus

all the other people doing attacks.

Good question.

No.

Um, maybe, maybe some of their tactics, uh, but at the same time.

Yeah, there's, there's no honor among thieves.

So you could, you could give them $30,000 and a week later they could just say,

sorry, it wasn't successful, and they could have just done nothing and taken

Hmm.

Hmm.

Uh, but, but at the same time, they're getting paid to, to play.

Uh, and so they're probably gonna do the campaign and, and see what they can make

out of it and keep their percentage.

Uh, but to my knowledge, I don't think that's any different than how

they would attack somebody directly.

Yeah, the, this is actually a really good point because I, this came out

in our previous discussion and I think I'm finally getting, like this is all

finally settling in and that is that they're different than a SaaS provider

where if I go and I say, I want.

A hundred Microsoft 365.

Uh, licenses, right?

I'm given a portal.

I'm given a, an admin login, and I log in, and then I administer 365.

I'm still not administering the hardware and the, and the infrastructure

behind it, but I am administering.

The, my portion of that world, but it sounds like that just doesn't happen here.

I don't even get a portal.

I'm just, I, I, like you said, I just sit back and I watch my wallet grow.

Does that sound right?

Yep.

That's, that's pretty common.

Well, I mean, to, to Prasanna's point, uh, well, and even a point I made

earlier about risk mitigation, uh, they want to keep an arm's length.

They don't want you to have access to anything.

They don't want to tie you as the, uh, the perpetrator who's probably

gonna get caught, to them at all.

So they don't want.

They don't want you to have a, a link or a login or evidence of a webpage

or a cached view of a dashboard.

They don't want any of that.

You're gonna communicate with them through a chat in a, in a, in a TOR network, which

stands for The Onion Router, on the dark net, and you're gonna negotiate and pay

everything that way and set everything up.

And that's pretty much it.

may, there may be some back and forth once or twice, uh, through a chat.

Um, but, or a forum.

But yeah, there's, there's no access.

Viewing artifacts, dashboard results, anything.

It's you pay them and you hope they keep their end of the bargain and

something shows up in your wallet.

Parsing what Mike said.

So why, like, I'm just trying to understand like how did ransomware

as a service really come about?

Because it seems like.

These operators are taking some risk, right?

Because there is that communication with these third parties or other people who

want to do attacks who will probably be caught, like you mentioned, right?

And they are taking all the risk.

But why would the ransomware as a service like I get, they get paid

upfront, but it just seems like so much risk to them be offering this.

For potentially not a huge payout.

Well, it's, it's, it's like, uh.

It's like running a million dollar company, but you

still buy a lottery ticket,

Mm-hmm.

right?

So you're still, you know, it would be nice to win the lottery even though

I've got this profitable company.

That's what they're doing.

So ransomware actors are making a lot of money, but they're

still buying lottery tickets.

In this case, the lottery ticket is somebody paying them to run a campaign.

Maybe it's a custom campaign.

Maybe it's one they didn't intend to run.

Maybe it was the next one they were gonna run, but they still got an

extra, however much money it is.

We, we've been saying 30,000, it could be 10,000.

It could be a hundred thousand, and it could change based on the,

the criteria from the buyer, right.

The entrepreneur.

Uh, so it, it's like playing the lottery in addition to your day job.

I would not doubt.

For a minute.

There's no evidence of this, but I would not doubt for a minute that if you bought

into this ransomware as a service and the bad guys have your, uh, your, you know,

your tour, uh, identity so that they can communicate with you, I have no doubt

that they're posting that over, you know, all over the evidence so that if they

do get caught, you're the patsy, right?

So.

That doesn't sound good.

And that's how they

That's not very nice.

case.

So you're paying them and they're using you as a scapegoat,

uh, if things go south.

Although, I mean, there's, there's argument there too, because if I'm a

threat actor, uh, if I'm a ransomware actor, I'm using my ransomware.

Right,

even though someone's paying me to do the attack, it's still my ransomware.

So when law enforcement comes knocking, even though they hit them, they're

gonna go, but I paid for the service.

And

right.

so it's still, it's still tied to me as the, as the developer and, and,

Right.

that's using that ransomware.

But guys got their, their patsy, so.

Now, earlier you talked about that there were all these different disciplines

within that ransomware world, right?

So you've got the, the initial access brokers, you've got those

that collect email addresses.

You've got those that you know that are good at lateral movement, um,

and all these different aspects.

Is this where the affiliate model comes into play?

Uh, for sure.

And so a affiliates are, are generally, uh, threat actors that have been, um.

Validated.

You know, there's some, they, they've, they've got street cred.

They've, they've looked into you, you're not law enforcement.

They, they don't think you are.

uh, there's also a business model in that.

for example, if I'm a ransomware, uh, threat actor, and I need targets, I need,

I need those valid, you know, uh, good email addresses or credentials to use in

Mm-hmm.

Um.

And I know you're a, uh, you're initial, you, you're an access broker or you're,

you're somebody that can get those, right?

Maybe you're, maybe you're a data broker.

Mm-hmm.

call you and say, Hey, can we build a relationship?

So now we're an affiliate affiliates do a couple things.

One, uh.

I don't have to pay you upfront in some cases.

So for a million emails, that might be like $5,000 or, or six or seven.

Depends.

so instead of paying you upfront for that as an affiliate, especially if

you can't show me and it's difficult to do, out of a million records,

how many of these did you validate?

You're just gonna go, well, you know, over half are valid.

I'm gonna go, all right, well, why don't I just make you an affiliate?

And as an affiliate, you get paid.

I'll pay you some money for the, for the data, but then I'm also

gonna pay you a percentage of what we make off of this attack.

So as an affiliate, you know, there's, there's different, uh, income models.

I.

Interesting.

the benefit to the affiliate for this, though?

Uh, now, now we're, we're, we're, we're trusted partners and you're gonna,

you're gonna keep coming back to me for more, for more access and we've

built this business model now so that you're not at a bunch of money upfront.

And then I can appreciate maybe a little bit more than, than retail price or, or

going price for the data because we've got this success model built on the backend.

Well, and I think that it, it, it's basically, it's sort of a mini version

of the RAs model, uh, you know, on the back end that basically the, the

reason is that you got this one person or company or whatever, and they're.

Really good at getting new valid email addresses.

And that's all they're really good at.

They don't know how to break into something.

They don't know how to send emails.

They just know how to find emails.

Right.

So they're just really good.

They're like, we do this one thing and so we'll give you, you know, go do

what These emails, whatever you want.

Uh, we just want to, we just want to cut.

Uh.

another example of an affiliate program in the criminal enterprise.

Um, you know, let's take a dating site.

Uh, most females get free access to the dating site.

so as a female, we can set up bots or, or guys registering

as females to try and interact

Right,

other guys that are paying to be a part of this.

Uh, and, and the sole objective is to get their personal email address.

right.

hey, you know, wink, wink, nudge, uh.

I like you, let's talk, and over a period of time, there's finally,

I'd like to send you some more pictures that I can't post on this,

Hmm.

platform, you know, what's a good email address?

And then you never hear from me again because I just took that

email address and sold it, to an affiliate that does nothing but spam.

So the affiliate bought emails from me and then.

That affiliate is tied to a pornography site, and for every, every visit to

that pornography site, from a, a known, you know, cataloged email address,

the affiliate gets $25, and that was happening a million times a day.

Wow.

That's a lot of porn.

Um.

I mean, you don't even have to.

Create an account just clicking the

Right.

Just, oh, just click in the link and they get paid.

that you're the

They get paid.

and this is the affiliate that sent you, gets them the money.

attribution.

Right.

Yep.

Yeah.

Fascinating.

So you talked about.

This offering ransomware as service.

we look at the current environment, and I know things are constantly evolving, how

many organizations are there out there that are offering ransomware as service?

That changes every day.

Um, you know, the big ones, there's probably six or so.

Um, I mean, if you.

of those, oh, go ahead.

I was gonna say, if you Google that now or ask gr or Gemini, uh,

you'll, you'll probably get some that, that started yesterday.

Yeah.

So, so, so of these six though, how many entrepreneurs in your terminology are

there, out there using like these six?

Is it like of people are using this infrastructure, or is it like millions?

Well, and, and I, I, I alluded to this earlier, never came back to it,

but there's layers of, uh, of, um, consumers of ransomware as a service.

So there's the entrepreneur, you know, Bob in Florida just wants,

you know, some mailbox money and he has an extra, you know, couple

thousand dollars to throw at this.

so that's the.

We would call those new noobs or script kitties.

Like they don't know what they're doing, they just, they know how to push

a button or somebody to do something.

Uh, so that's kind of bottom level, mid tiers, more technical people that probably

can put up some safeguards to protect their anonymity and their smart about how

to, how to manage their cryptocurrency and use it to buy things and pay for things.

Um, then there's the, the other threat actors.

Uh, and so maybe, um, maybe my objective isn't ransomware money.

It, it isn't the, the, the, the crippling of a company.

It's, I want to extort, I want to extract their data, I want their data,

Hmm.

or, uh, I want this ransomware event to be a distraction some other type of attack.

Right?

So there's, there's the other threat actor, and then there's

the nation state actors.

Uh, so, Yeah.

Organized government actors, uh, employing these, uh, these ransomware

as a service guys to, to do, to do their thing for, for whatever they're,

that'll support their, their bigger plan.

Yeah, you did mention in the previous episode that I could, if I, if I wanted

to attack a given company or a given, you know, that I could literally, I,

I'm guessing that's probably extra a targeted attack, uh, at a company.

Uh, I could, I can pay a ransomware as a service provider to do that.

Like you said, if I wanna steal the data or if I just, I just want to cripple them.

Uh, or if I just.

I don't know.

I, I'm gonna steal money from somebody I wanna steal from this company because

I might, because it might do them harm.

Yep.

Yeah.

Fascinating.

Um, you know, when you, when you talked about the, um, uh,

using it as subterfuge, right?

Uh, I, I, I was thinking about.

If I remember the what?

No, no, no.

I was thinking about the, the, the, the, the Conti group attack of Costa

Costa Rica and where it, it appears, if I have the details correctly, it

appears that this giant attack, that the whole thing was subterfuge to, um.

To allow them to sort of fade off into the wilderness.

'cause they were, at the time, they were very heavily, uh, there was

a lot of, uh, heat on them, right?

There was a lot of, um, you know, government agencies that were after them.

And so this was a way for them to, to basically fed off.

So everybody was busy trying to figure out how to fight this giant, uh, attack.

Meanwhile, the only purpose of the attack was to allow the Conti

group to sort of fade off into the woodwork and, and all the, the bad

guys go working for somebody else.

But, um, it's, these aren't nice people, Mike.

They're, they're not, uh.

They're not very respected.

Uh, you know, they don't, they don't, uh, they're not empathetic or sympathetic.

Uh, they're not, you know, they're not hardened, malicious,

like killer bad people.

They're just, uh, they hide behind the computer and, and they don't,

they don't know their victims in a lot of cases, so they don't

Right,

feel bad.

right.

I think that's on purpose too.

Not knowing the victim, I.

it's, it, it goes to the, the mentality of, of a lot of cyber criminals.

They, they're very, uh, in a lot of cases, they're introverted.

They're usually on the, the, uh, autism spectrum somewhere,

uh, you know, socially awkward.

not all of them.

I mean, there's, there's some, I mean, there was even a Rolling Stone

article back in the day of, of, uh, a hacker called the Soup Nazi.

Um.

He was, he was extravagant.

He would go to, to parties and flaunt his wealth and his cars.

And that was, that's, uh, that's, that's, that's the exception.

There's a few like that, but for the most part, very, very quiet,

introverted, uh, socially awkward people.

So the stereotypical computer person that everybody thinks about.

Yep.

Yep.

Yeah.

All right.

Well, it's been fun.

I, I, I like this idea or I, I, I'm glad I, I think I have a better understanding

now of this concept of, of ransomware as a service that it literally is like, I just

sort of, I give you money, you go attack people on my behalf, and I get money.

I don't do anything other than that.

Right.

Uh, other than maybe I, I might target you.

I might ask you to target a specific group of people, but I'm not, it's not

like, I guess prior to, you know, you discussing it, I had this idea that you

would provide for me a platform that I would then use to attack people, but

it sounds like it's not that at all.

Right.

Maybe not today.

Maybe not fair.

Sure.

very, all you know, don't, don't look behind the curtain type.

Don't, you know, don't, don't mind the, the man behind the curtain.

Just, uh, just sit back and, and wait for the money to roll in.

Nice.

off.

Nice Wizard of Oz, reference there.

All right, well thanks.

Thanks Mike for another great episode.

Thank you guys.

Thanks, Prasanna.

You're welcome.

I.

That is a wrap.